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ABSTRACT 
The demands of transportation have driven the automobile industry into an 
innovation race. Uncertain technological trends, long development cycles, 
highly capital-intensive product development, saturated markets, and 
environmental and safety regulations have subjected the sector to major 
transformations. The technological and organisational innovations related 
to these transformations necessitate research that can enhance our 
understanding of the characteristics of the new systems. The study 
investigates the applicability of the Open Innovation concept to a mature 
capital-intensive asset-based industry - the European automobile industry, 
which is preparing for a radical technological discontinuity. Purposely 
selected knowledgeable respondents were interviewed across seven 
European countries. The findings contribute to the understanding of the OI 
concept by identifying key obstacles to the wider adoption of the OI model 
in the European car industry, and signalling the importance of 
intermediaries and large incumbents for driving network development and 
OI practices as well as the need of new competencies to be developed by all 
players. 
Key words: open innovation, networks, car industry, SMEs   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The car industry has a major influence on transportation developments in general and on 
the wider concerns about climate change. Transportation policies and innovation in the 
car industry are critical to the radical change necessitated by the demands of climate 
concerns.  
With huge development costs, long development cycles and fierce global competition, 
the car industry is a traditionally closed industry. Costs must be contained, and yet 
customers in nearly saturated markets still desire new, cutting-edge products (Ili et al, 
2010, Lazzarotti et al, 2013). Moreover, significant amounts of resources have been 
spent in recent years on lowering emissions and on the development of 
environmentally-friendly vehicles. The transition to such vehicles requires a radical and 
costly technological and organisational shift in automobile operations.  
Under growing pressures from increasingly demanding customers, safety and 
environmental regulations worldwide, the automotive sector has entered an innovation 
race. Sustained competitive advantage increasingly depends on the ability to improve 
and accelerate innovation output continuously (Fallah and Lechler, 2008). Innovation 
has become largely dependent on the ability to monitor all the latest market and 
technological developments and integrate various complex technologies.  
The constraints of the monolithic, vertically integrated firm in scanning the environment 
and identifying relevant technological breakthroughs and market changes have given 
rise to the networked organisation characterised by porous boundaries and numerous 
linkages with other organisations. In the car industry, large manufacturers, also known 
as Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), form clusters and wider networks 
driving a deep restructuring of the supply chains and transforming them into supply 
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networks (Karlsson and Sköld, 2013, Dilk et al, 2008). The number of participants and 
interdependences within and between these networks, coupled with a turbulent business 
environment and shortening product life cycles generate high complexity of innovation 
tasks and decision-making. The question that arises is how and why networks are 
formed in an industry preparing for a radical technological shift, which requires a major 
rethink of its approach to innovation.  
Indeed, Open Innovation appears in policy advice as the way forward for the industry 
(MacNeill and Bailey, 2010) and the involvement of Small to Medium sized 
Enterprises, SMEs, as providers of new technologies to OI ecosystems is seen as 
particularly suited to electric vehicle development (Parker and Parry-Jones, 2013). 
However, the application of the Open Innovation model has been little investigated in 
the context of mature asset-based industries (e.g. Chiaroni, 2010), like the car industry.  
Against this background, our study aims to explore the application of the OI model to a 
mature asset-based industry – the European car industry - in the light of the radical 
technological discontinuity taking place in the sector.  
More specifically, we aim to investigate: 
• How and why networks are formed; 
• What inflows and outflows of knowledge circulate within the networks and how 
companies make use of them; 
• What is the role of different size enterprises in the generation of innovation and 
how they interact in the process;  
• How intermediate markets and institutions facilitate interorganisational interactions. 
 
The paper is divided into five main sections. It begins with theoretical background of 
the study and review of the existing research on OI in the car industry. A methodology 
section follows, with the description of the investigation protocol. Then, the paper 
presents the findings of the semi-structured interviews conducted in seven countries. 
The following section is focused on discussion proposing a large-scale innovation 
model of innovation in the car industry. Finally, the conclusions and limitations of the 
study are reported. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. OPEN INNOVATION 
The Open Innovation (OI) model has become popular through providing a different 
perspective on how companies can create and profit from innovation (Chesbrough, 
2006, Gassmann, 2006). OI has been defined as ‘the use of purposive inflows and 
outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and to expand the markets for 
external use of innovation’ (Chesbrough et al., 2006, p.1). Outbound knowledge flows 
are defined as unused technologies that can be sold or licensed to organisations with 
better suited for their commercialization business models (Chesbrough and Crowther, 
2006). Hence, in contrast to the traditional model where innovation is internally 
generated and marketed, the OI model recommends utilization of both internal and 
external sources of ideas. OI is all about leveraging and utilising knowledge inside as 
well as outside the organisation in order to exploit innovation opportunities. 
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The idea of sourcing knowledge externally is not new (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982, 
Von Hippel, 1988, Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) but Chesbrough’s work provides an 
overarching concept encompassing various research streams. The basic assumption 
behind the OI model is that even large enterprises can no longer possess all the 
capabilities and resources to generate innovation by themselves and need to capitalize 
on external knowledge (Gassmann, 2006). Indeed, in the car industry the increasing 
complexity of cars as products reflects the growing number of technical fields that 
provide opportunities for new developments and problem-solving. The growing 
importance of deep specialized knowledge in these fields necessitates an upsurge of 
R&D investment and need for organisational capabilities that allow absorption and 
integration of external knowledge. To deal with the tension between cost pressures and 
the need for diverse specialized knowledge , car manufacturers focus on their core 
competences and outsource other activities thus forming networks of suppliers (e.g. 
Ward, 2014, Schmitt and Biesebroeck, 2013, Frigant, 2011). 
Thus the role of OEMs in the increasingly distributed value networks is seen as system 
integrators who must possess capabilities to specify and test externally produced 
components, and to coordinate the integration of new technologies. Integrative 
competencies, however, are not as strongly associated with particular areas of 
technological knowledge but relate to application-specific knowledge and adaptability 
to environmental changes such as emergence of new technologies. Hence, for large 
organisations the adoption of the OI model necessitates organisational innovation and 
adoption of structures that allow adaptability and flexibility for optimal combination of 
internal competencies and external knowledge (Christensen, 2006, Chiaroni, 2010).  
It is less clear, however, what is the role of SMEs in the generation of innovation in the 
distributed value networks in a mature industry preparing for a radical technological 
change. The ability of SMEs to innovate has become increasingly important in the light 
of deepening trends for specialisation. Yet, while some studies report that entrepreneurs 
and SMEs are great idea hunters because they are skilled at opportunity recognition 
(O'Connor, 2006), it is also argued that many SMEs lack the capability to innovate (e.g. 
Vermeulen, 2005). Lack of resources and limited access to qualified labour are often 
cited as the main obstacles to SMEs’ ability to innovate (Amini, 2004).  
One way to overcome these deficiencies is through engaging in interorganisational 
networks, which reinforce SMEs’ innovative ability by providing them with a window 
on technological and market change, and sources of technical assistance and potentially 
available resource flows (Vermeulen, 2005, O’Regan and Kling, 2011). However, 
existing research is inconclusive about the ability of SMEs to engage in networks and 
exploit effectively external scientific and technical knowledge to support their 
innovation. Some authors argue that SMEs have a good ability to create and make use 
of network relationships due to their size (Massa and Testa, 2008) while others claim 
that SMEs have weak external contacts precisely because of their size (Srinivasan et al., 
2002). Moreover, SMEs are generally short of managerial resources and find it difficult 
to manage a broad network due to a very high opportunity cost of management time 
(Srinivasan et al., 2002, Lowik et al., 2012). 
To reap the benefits of OI, thus offsetting the limitations of resource shortages, SMEs 
need to build a strong regime of appropriability in the early stages of the technology life 
cycle through establishing a combination of patents and deep and complex technology 
knowledge base, generally unrelated to the knowledge bases of the large players 
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(Christensen, 2006).  Moreover, SMEs should make this technology base attractive to 
incumbents through codification, documentation, and communication, and engage in 
cooperation with incumbents to create functional solutions and test market potential 
(ibid.) or sell the technology to complete its commercialisation (O’Connor, 2006). Thus, 
one way or another, entrepreneurs and SMEs are bound to become involved with large 
incumbents (Christensen, 2006, Teece, 1986).  
In sum, this perspective suggests that SMEs deliver innovative ideas and technologies, 
which large enterprises integrate in product architecture in exchange for complementary 
assets (Christensen, 2006). While SMEs and entrepreneurs concentrate on exploration 
and perhaps some experimentation, large incumbents step into the final stage and take 
over experimentation and exploitation, instituting repeatable processes such as 
manufacturing, delivery and customer contact and support (O’Connor, 2006). Such 
symbiotic relationship, theoretically at least, can compensate for the cumbersome 
structures of large enterprises as well as for the resource shortages of SMEs.  
However, do SMEs possess the managerial and organisational capabilities to secure 
rents from the technological knowledge when collaborating with large incumbents? 
Shortage of managerial resources (Lowik et al., 2012) combined with asymmetric 
information, insufficient bargaining power, economic incentive conflicts and associated 
opportunistic behavior, and differences in norms and procedures are likely to result in 
SMEs being squeezed in the negotiation rounds and exit, or be acquired (Christensen, 
2006, Christensen et al, 2005). 
Last but not least, the OI model is highly dependent upon intermediate markets where 
entrepreneurs supply new discoveries and highly specialised technological capabilities, 
possibly in collaboration with research institutions, to large companies, like OEMs, who 
in turn provide integrative capabilities, transform technologies into application-specific 
use, and complementary assets for large scale commercialisation of innovation (West 
and Bogers, 2014, Lee et al., 2010, Sieg et al, 2010, Spithoven et al., 2010, Chesbrough, 
2006a, Teece, 1986). Thus the OI model highlights the prominence of market-
supporting institutions in promoting technological entrepreneurship as well as the 
importance of multiple ties among organisations and various types of institutions, e.g. 
universities, research centres, government and regional institutions (Simard and West, 
2006). It is important to explore to what extent intermediate markets and institutions 
facilitate interorganisational interactions in the car industry.  
 
2.2. OPEN INNOVATION IN THE CAR INDUSTRY 
To have external validity, a paradigm must explain evidence beyond its initial area of 
enquiry (Yin, 1988). However, the evidence to support the OI concept is taken almost 
exclusively from evidence in the context of high-paced industries, such as computers, 
software industry and pharmaceuticals (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 
West and Gallagher, 2006, Gardet and Fraiha, 2012). Whether the OI concept can be 
applied in lower tech or more mature industries, remains an open question. Mature 
industries display very different characteristics in terms of types of innovation, handling 
of intellectual property rights (IP), patterns of innovation diffusion, risk management as 
well as strategies for exploiting innovation. Hence it is important to examine whether 
the OI model is appropriate in other industry settings and what obstacles prevent the 
wider adoption of the model. 
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As in many other industries (e.g. Coombs & Richards, 1993, Christensen, 2002), in the 
1980s, the car industry witnessed a move from the prevalent central-R&D-lab model 
towards a more distributed R&D model through supplier involvement in new product 
development. While this may be seen as a move towards OI, suppliers were still 
working under strict guidelines and specifications provided by OEMs. Although 
specifications vary in the level of detail (Ge and Fujimoto, 2006), their prescriptive 
nature make it problematic to see the resulting output as purposive knowledge inflows 
intended to accelerate internal innovation in OEMs. OEMs still maintained powerful 
central laboratories while experimenting with ways of coordinating R&D at different 
levels (Tidd et al., 2005, Argyres, 1995). The move in the 80s has been branded ‘a 
dismal failure’ by industry practitioners and resulted in transferring the design control 
and product validation back to OEMs in the 90's.    
Whilst there are examples of Open Innovation in the automotive industry, some of 
which have been studied (e.g. De Massis et al, 2012; Lazzarotti et al, 2013), the industry 
as a whole remains conservative. An early study by Ili et al (2010) examines OI and 
demonstrates that the car industry displays all the relevant properties suggesting that the 
OI model would be appropriate, i.e. it is highly globalised, technology intensive, 
characterised by high levels of technology fusion and open to identifying and 
implementing new business models. The one idiosyncrasy that does not fit the OI model 
is the observed low level of knowledge leveraging. The authors conclude that the closed 
innovation paradigm still dominates the industry and recommend that the car industry 
should consider the OI model despite the remaining barriers.  
Di Minin et al (2010) develop a case study of Fiat and conclude that OI is a bifocal 
strategy, in the sense that it balances the need to stay focused when only meager 
resources are available and continue investing in the company’s future thus 
strengthening operational efficiency while preserving and enhancing R&D 
effectiveness.  
Stating that there are few studies about the topic, Lazzarotti et al (2013) explore 
whether, why and how OI is adopted in the automotive field. Based on three case 
studies, the authors agree with Ili et al (2010) in confirming the automotive industry as 
‘being trapped by cost and innovation pressure by customers’ (Lazzarotti et al, 
2013:53). The authors see partnerships as a manifestation of OI in the automotive 
industry, conclude that Tier 1 suppliers are more likely to engage with a wider 
knowledge base to pull new technologies. OI is seen as the way ahead and further 
investigation of OI practices of SMEs in the industry is recommended.  
Depicting the network as a more relevant level of analysis than the firm, Karlsson and 
Sköld (2013) examine OI practices in the car industry through focusing on the various 
collaborations and relationships of a single large global automotive OEM. The authors 
distinguish between vertical and horizontal relationships and find that large enterprises 
developing and manufacturing complex products may use many different forms of OI 
resulting in the concurrent existence of combined openness and closedness in 
innovation for different purposes. The paper concludes that patterns of OI are primarily 
found in vertical relationships but even in those, ‘closed’ signatures are found in 
relation to large influential suppliers owning scarce technology or prescribing 
technological content. Such relationships are nevertheless seen as OI because the 
innovation activities were performed outside of the firm boundaries. Horizontal 
relationships are found to be dominated by closed innovation. 
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In sum, despite extant research pointing to the relatively closed nature of the 
interorganisational relationships in the car industry, we still know little about the ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ of OI in this conservative industrial setting. Little attention has been devoted 
to the question whether OEMs possess the capabilities needed to become the leaders of 
OI ecosystems, i.e. supporting and accelerating inflows and outflows of knowledge to 
facilitate innovation and efficiency. For mature traditional companies like car 
manufacturers, OI is a marked departure from previous integrated ‘industrial’ models. 
OI necessitates competencies in identifying and exploring unexpected opportunities that 
emerge from technological breakthroughs outside of the firm.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
We applied a qualitative inductive approach as the variable-oriented techniques would 
not allow us, for example, to address questions about motivation or to observe causal 
processes (Rueschemeyer & Stephens, 1997), particularly with regard to sensitive issues 
such as interorganisational relationships, interaction problems, intellectual property (IP) 
rights, and perceived risks. Moreover, the use of OI in a mature industry preparing for a 
radical technological shift is a complex, novel, and little studied phenomenon, and we 
wanted to capture the details and iteractions that were making the story. 
 
3.1. SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS 
The study applies the principle of data source triangulation, whereby the phenomenon 
of interest is studied at different places (Stake, 1995), e.g. across organisations, which 
vary in terms of size, locality, or industrial background, in order to achieve validity of 
interpretation, explanation and generalization. The respondents in our study come from 
seven European countries - Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and 
UK.  
It is often problematic for the researcher to identity key informants who can provide the 
most relevant information (Fontana & Frey, 1994). Consistent with the logic of Huber 
and Power (1985), who argue for selecting knowledgeable informants, the respondents 
for this study were purposely selected to represent car industry stakeholders from one of 
the following groups: OEMs, large suppliers also known as Tier 1 suppliers, SMEs, 
regional authorities, cluster management, regional universities or research institutes 
involved with the automotive industry, and regional support agencies (description of the 
respondents in Appendix A).   
This approach allowed examination of the experiences and perspectives of a diverse 
selection of individuals who were directly involved with the studied phenomena hence 
ensuring the research problem was approached ‘in a rounded and multi-faceted way’ 
(Mason, 1996, pp. 149).  
 
3.2. DATA COLLECTION 
The employed research instrument was semi-structured, open-ended interview for its 
potential to generate rich and detailed accounts of the interviewed individuals’ 
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experience. This research instrument allows the discussion to lead into areas which may 
not have been considered prior to the interview but may be potentially relevant. This 
flexibility was particularly important in our study due to the different professional 
background of the respondents and the need to make full use of their individual 
experiences, while ensuring consistency and comparability across the interviews.  
A set of directional topics (Appendix B) was prepared, reflecting the insights gained 
from the review of the relevant existing literature. The questions were designed in most 
general terms to allow multiple site research and collection of data comparable across 
country boundaries and organisational settings. The specific questions and their order 
varied between interviews depending on the conversational flow while the common 
topics ensured comparability across interviews. 
The data collection was completed over a three-month period (January – March 2012). 
Each interview began with a brief professional history of the interviewee. These 
narratives lasted approximately 5-10 minutes and were used as the basis for follow-up 
questions for the remainder of each interview.  The interviews ranged in length from 50 
to 90 minutes. All interviews were taped and transcribed. 
The interviewees were encouraged to develop their views around the open-ended 
questions. The interviews captured a broad picture of the automobile industry and the 
processes taking place in the sector because most of the respondents had occupied 
different positions or worked in different companies in the industry over a number of 
years. These individuals were able to reflect on their experiences and provided valuable 
insights into the studied problems. 
Thirty interviews were conducted until it was felt that theoretical saturation was reached 
and we felt confident about the meaning and importance of the findings (Bryman and 
Burgess, 1994).  
 
3.3. DATA ANALYSIS  
In qualitative research, theory and concepts tend to emerge from the inquiry, coming 
after data collection rather than before (Robson, 2002). Following this logic, the study 
adopted a holistic unstructured approach to the data analysis, allowing themes to emerge 
from a close reading of the interview transcripts rather than using preconceived 
categories (Dey, 1995, Charmaz, 2014). This approach is underpinned by Kolb’s 
learning cycle model (Colombo et al., 2012, Kolb, 1985), which consists of four stages: 
data collection, reflective observation, abstract conceptualisation and active 
experimentation, as set out with the research method in Fig 1. 
The data were initially broken down into categories (nodes) corresponding to the 
directional interview topics (Appendix B). To ensure respondents’ anonymity as well as 
links to the original files, all the data were coded and cross-referenced. In those cases 
where the respondent’s reply addressed more than one node, the data were coded into 
both categories. The data were then searched for patterns and reoccurring events in 
order to identify emerging themes (Gephart, 1993, Miles and Huberman, 1994). A 
theme was defined as a recurring topic of discussion that captured an interview’s central 
ideas (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). Continuous comparison across the interviews 
ensured that all reoccurring events were accounted for and grouped together (Glaser 
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1978, Gephart, 1993). The data were then reordered to reflect the research objectives of 
the study. NVivo9 software package was used to assist the organisation of the data. 
 
 
Fig. 1 The research method set out as four stages to mirror Kolb (1985) 
 
Finally, the identified patterns were checked for a fit with existing models and concepts. 
This grounding in the existing knowledge corresponds to the final stage of Kolb’s 
learning cycle model and provides conceptual leverage to the significance of the 
emerged concepts and models (Glaser, 1978).  
 
3.4. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
To ensure reliability of the findings, all the interviews and consequent comments were 
tape-recorded and transcribed, and consistent data coding and sorting were deployed 
and documented.  
In qualitative research, the primary checks on validity are internal checks on the validity 
of the data (Kirk and Miller, 1986). Hence, the emerging categories were continuously 
refined in parallel with the process of interviewing. As the research progressed and new 
or inconsistent data were collected, the categories were constantly compared and 
modified. Moreover, all the interviewees agreed to follow-up calls and emails and, 
where necessary, elaborated on unclear points. To assist the validation of the findings, 
the interviewer summarised the key points for each section of the questionnaire and 
asked the respondents to comment on the truthfulness of the interpretation. The 
identified inconsistencies were recorded and used to support the data analysis.  
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4. FINDINGS 
In this section the key findings of the study are summarised. First, we discuss some 
general findings about the formation of different types of networks in the car industry. 
After that, the findings concerning knowledge flows and exchanges are presented 
followed by findings describing the role of different size enterprises in the generation of 
innovation. Finally, the role of intermediaries in supporting innovation are discussed. 
The anonymised respondents are listed by type in Appendix A and referenced in the text 
by R1, R2 to R30. Appendix C contains some key evidence in support of our findings. 
 
4.1. NETWORK FORMATION IN THE EUROPEAN CAR INDUSTRY 
Our findings show that two types of networks can be distinguished in the EU car 
industry: formal networks, known as ‘clusters’, and informal networks. The latter can be 
project-based networks, typically initiated by research centres, or free networks, strictly 
based on trust and credibility. These were termed ‘informal’ to indicate the temporary, 
project-based, problem-oriented character of such networks. The clusters, on the other 
hand, are formal networks, typically established and funded by the industry and the 
regional authorities. We found such regional industry networks in all the countries 
covered by this study.   
The cluster networks differ between countries in a number of characteristics, e.g. size, 
variety of membership, method of funding, level of organisation, level of support and 
type of services for member companies. However, the better-developed clusters 
typically involve ‘a cross-section of the industry’ (R20) as well as research 
organisations and universities.  
Large incumbents participate in clusters mainly to secure a window on potentially 
innovative developments. While the evidence shows that OEMs may not necessarily see 
benefits in network membership, it also shows that large enterprises are interested in 
networking per se as a source of new ideas.  
In the less developed clusters, the member base is typically limited to SMEs, 
universities and support institutions. The clusters, in which large incumbents are absent, 
tend to be under-resourced and often dissolve over the course of several years. SMEs 
participate in the clusters to gain bargaining power, access to technology and expertise, 
managerial and administrative support. Most importantly, the clusters support the 
regional automotive SMEs through facilitating their relationships with the large OEMs, 
Tier 1s, public authorities and research institutions.  
Interactions between SMEs and larger incumbents are seen as having a strong positive 
effect on SMEs’ technological and organisational capabilities. While in the less-
developed clusters SMEs work together to increase their buying power and bid for work 
on larger and more complex projects, SMEs in the well-developed clusters have the 
opportunity to work on advanced R&D projects in cooperation with OEMs and Tier 1 
suppliers as well as with universities and research institutes.  
‘The OEM is a nucleus for this kind of companies [SMEs]’ R134 
                                                             
4 Respondents are referenced by number. 
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The regional clusters are seen as important platforms for developing ties between 
organisations of different sizes, providing a platform for exchange of ideas, facilitating 
interorganisational communication, nurturing fostering trust, as well as supporting the 
development of managerial and R&D capabilities in SMEs. The spatial proximity of the 
member organisations within the clusters is seen as important due to the uncertainty and 
multidisciplinary nature of large complex development projects. 
 
4.2. KNOWLEDGE FLOWS IN THE NETWORKS 
The key characteristics of a network are the participating actors, the relationships 
between them, and the resources exchanged through these relationships. In the context 
of OI, the existence, intensity and direction of the knowledge flows circulating between 
the participating actors in the network indicate to what extent OI practices are 
employed. We distinguish three types of purposive knowledge flows in the industry: (i) 
between OEMs/Tier 1s and knowledge institutions, (ii) between OEMs/Tier 1s and 
SMEs, and (iii) between SMEs and knowledge institutions. Our findings strongly 
indicate that problems and barriers exist at all levels and knowledge flows in the car 
industry are, although to a different degree, largely restricted.  
In the traditional industrial segments, the incoming knowledge flows of car 
manufacturers are strictly limited to large suppliers and research institutes. As noted in 
the previous section, a key feature of the better-developed clusters is the presence of 
OEMs and good working, yet narrow in scope, relationships between the OEMs and the 
member universities, including ‘involvement of students into production for training 
purposes’ (R25) and contribution to research development.  
OEMs work much more intensively with research institutes and outsource R&D, ‘or 
rather D’ (R17). The key considerations underpinning the use of research centres by 
OEMs are costs, time to market, the progressive complexity of cars as products, the 
corresponding necessary diverse knowledge base and increasingly shortening 
technology life cycles. While OEMs do outsource development projects to research 
organisations, they also retain key capabilities internally. The adopted approach is 
twofold.  Internally, large manufacturers create the structure and the specifications, 
while externally they task R&D organisations with the development of the necessary 
subsystems. Such approach ensures that internal capabilities are maintained to allow 
successful integration of the sourced components and systems. Indeed, research 
institutes as well as suppliers work to OEMs’ strict specifications. The dominant 
approach of OEMs appears to be sourcing of external technology as a ‘black box’ 
component for modular systems integration (Jaspers and van de Ende, 2010).  
The data strongly indicate that both the incoming and the outgoing knowledge flows of 
OEMs are strictly controlled and restricted to the relationships with trusted Tier 1 
suppliers. Notable exceptions are the fewer relationships with research organisations as 
discussed above. Relationships between OEMs and SMEs are indirect and only possible 
through the mediation of Tier 1 suppliers or regional clusters. The key barrier to the use 
of external knowledge by OEMs appears to be the lack of trust rooted in the capital 
intensity of the industry and the related momentum of production, credibility, cost, risk 
aversion and responsibility considerations. As one of the respondents noted:  
 ‘You have to trust in others’ knowledge, that is a learning process.’R16  
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The data also points to mindset of R&D staff as being a big part of the resistance to 
external ideas. The cultural and organisational barriers to OI identified by Ili et al. 
(2010) in the German car industry, including the ‘not-invented-here’ syndrome, lack of 
appropriate processes, and top-down integration, were found to hold in all the national 
settings in our study.  
In addition, the very size of OEMs creates challenges of accessibility and transparency 
due to lack of efficient communication interface between OEMs and the rest of the 
industry, hence further restricting knowledge exchanges with organisations that do not 
belong to the close trusted circle of suppliers. Last but not least, the transaction costs 
associated with coordinating a large supply network were pointed out as an important 
consideration behind the small number of relationships that OEMs are willing to be 
closely involved in.  
An interesting distinction was made between the types of OEMs. It was pointed out that 
luxury car manufacturers tended to be ‘very open to new ideas. This is one of their sales 
points. But the volume manufacturers are not open.’ R25  
In contrast, Tier 1 suppliers appear to be well connected both upwards with the OEMs 
and downwards with the SMEs. They are also the ones who appear to be most open – 
not only they actively scan and select external ideas and knowledge, but they also 
attempt to maximise the exploitation of their own innovations by offering them to other 
industries.  
SMEs, on the other hand, find it next to impossible to exchange knowledge flows with 
OEMs and difficult to work with large suppliers due to the reasons discussed above. 
Hence, the paths for taking advantage of OI and making their technology base attractive 
to incumbents (Christensen, 2006), boil down to two: via Tier 1 suppliers or via the 
regional clusters. However, SMEs, engaging in collaborative work with large 
incumbents typically lack the managerial and organisational capabilities to secure rents 
from their technological knowledge, e.g. ‘resource management, project management, 
quality management’ R6. Cluster membership offers better chances of benefiting from 
own innovations. All in all, while SMEs may reap great benefits from OI in dynamic, 
knowledge-based, labour-intensive industries like the software industry, in mature 
capital-intensive asset-based industries like the car industry, they have limited options. 
SMEs themselves are very cautious in their interactions with other organisations due to 
appropriability concerns. The result is anxiety, closedness and reluctance to engage in 
even in cluster initiatives and work with universities. A comparison is made between 
SMEs and OEMs, pointing out that the latter had the organisational capabilities and 
resources to separate R&D projects and ensure that ‘inside knowledge that is very 
sensitive, they do not let out’ R13. In addition, universities are seen by SMEs as having 
a different agenda reflected by their approach to knowledge generation and project 
management. The challenge of inefficient use of external knowledge by SMEs is 
observed even in the most developed clusters. 
In concert with previous research, our findings show that the car industry is still a 
closed industry in a pressing need of cultural change if it is to accelerate innovation rate 
and adaptability. At present, the sector uses mainly its own direct environment as a 
trigger for innovation: the handling of IP is defence-oriented (Ili et al., 2010), while the 
most important drivers of innovation are legislation and regulations, followed by 
customer demand. Ultimately, the intensity and quality of participation and knowledge 
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exchange are contingent upon the beliefs and drive of the individuals involved. Existing 
mindsets and lack of trust in both OEMs and SMEs are cited as key communication 
barriers rooted in risk aversion, cost, and appropriability concerns.  
 
4.3.  THE ROLE OF ENTERPRISES OF DIFFERENT SIZE IN INNOVATION 
The data strongly indicate that key product innovations are driven by OEMs and 
executed by Tier 1 suppliers. The importance of OEM’s willingness and ability to lead 
innovation in the networks is highlighted beyond doubt by the respondents. As 
highlighted in the previous section, the progressive complexity of cars as products and 
the corresponding diverse knowledge base combined with increasingly shortening 
technology life cycles necessitate deep specialisation of tasks in the industry and 
underpin OEMs’ ‘black box’ approach to sourcing technology. However, OEMs are 
highly regarded for their knowledge and understanding of customer needs.  The role of 
car manufacturers is seen as innovation architects, technology selectors and integrators, 
responsible for the capital-intensive commercialisation of the end product.  
Tier 1 suppliers are regarded as powerful players, productive innovators as well as 
innovation selectors and integrators on a par with OEMs. They are expected not only to 
generate most innovation but also to ‘manage’ the rest of the suppliers hence reducing 
risk and transaction costs for OEMs. In other words, OEMs and Tier 1 suppliers possess 
the power and the competences to select the technologies and products that will reach 
mass commercialisation. Smaller suppliers are provided technical specifications and 
aggressive cost targets within which they must deliver. 
While most of the respondents shared the view that smaller suppliers contribute 
significantly to the innovation and expertise of large incumbents, in conventional 
automotive markets resource constraints and lack of credibility prevent SMEs from 
taking their inventions to the market and capitalising on them. Typically, the owners of 
worthy innovations are bought by Tier 1 suppliers. The dominant view is that rarely, if 
ever, an SME can capitalize on its own IP and grow to ‘a self-sustaining company 
because that is really serious capitalization’ R20. In other words, SMEs typically lack 
the complementary assets to scale innovation. 
However, opportunities are emerging and spaces are opening up for innovative SMEs in 
the new segments around environmentally friendly vehicles, e.g. in IT, electronics, 
software and mobility services, telematics, car entertainment, as well as the 
development of relevant infrastructure. While the car industry is still very much closed 
in its traditional segments, the expected shift to electrical vehicles is giving rise to OI 
practices in the emerging sustainable segments, where SMEs incubate radical 
innovations. These segments display all the signs of an emerging industry, e.g. lack of 
dominant design, low rate of market penetration, focus on technology and design, etc., 
hence creating space for innovation-potent SMEs.  
While large enterprises are proficient in managing existing markets and exploiting 
existing knowledge, SMEs act as explorers and engines of radical innovation because 
they do not suffer the bureaucracy of incumbents and can be flexible in structuring 
appropriate business models (Leifer et al, 2000, O’Connor and Rice, 2005). The new 
sustainable mobility paradigm opens up niches for SMEs to identify new needs and 
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satisfy these through innovative adaptation of deep specialised knowledge, including 
from cross-industry linkages. 
Yet, it was pointed out that the opportunities in the emerging sectors are limited in 
terms of potential market success in the short run due to insufficient demand. This 
limitation is very significant in the context of SMEs who typically suffer low survival 
rate in the first five years after establishment. In other words, in the face of insufficient 
demand in the short run, SMEs will not have the resources to sustain themselves until 
the new markets grow to a size that will allow them to capitalize on their inventions. 
Once again, they will have to negotiate with the large incumbents. 
 
4.4.  THE FACILITATING ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES  
In the context of OI, intermediate market-supporting institutions can promote 
entrepreneurship through reducing coordinating costs, increasing the scope for secure 
IP, and developing ties among the various players. They are the critical drivers of 
enhanced effectiveness in technological markets that help companies experiment with 
OI processes (West and Lakhani, 2008). 
Although there were differences in the level of development, we have observed attempts 
to establish intermediate institutions across all the countries in our study. The key role 
of intermediaries in the OI model is linking highly specialised suppliers of technology 
and technological capabilities. Different types of intermediaries have emerged to serve 
the technology markets in the car industry. Some provide managerial and administrative 
support, link enterprises according to their needs, coordinate the innovation efforts, 
assist interorganisational communication and dissemination of information, e.g. 
clusters. Others link universities to enterprises, fundamental research to applied 
research, and become directly involved with the innovation processes, e.g. research 
centres. Clusters play an important role in connecting smaller suppliers of technology 
with the OEMs and Tier 1s who possess the integrative capabilities and complementary 
assets needed for large-scale commercialisation.  
The examples of the well-developed regional clusters illustrate the importance of close 
interaction and exchange between the smaller and the larger players in the industry. As 
highlighted earlier, the absence of OEMs and Tier 1 suppliers from some of the clusters 
has negative impact upon the realised potential of the cluster. In contrast, where 
healthily-funded clusters assist the establishment of robust links between the players, 
SMEs demonstrate marked development in terms of technological and managerial 
capabilities.  
Last but not least, the clusters are seen as a sound solution to the problem of trust, which 
was identified as a major impediment to the wider adoption of OI practices in the 
industry.   
‘It is all about trust and the intermediary organizations could plant the seed of 
this trust, feed it, water it and try to be the gardener of it. They can ensure that all 
the frictions that exist in the networks are managed.’ R17  
In large development projects, clusters assume responsibility for their members and for 
project management thus removing to a great extent the element of risk and reducing the 
transaction costs associated with the coordination of numerous enterprises.  Together 
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with the larger industry incumbents, well-resourced clusters have the potential to drive 
innovation in the industry. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Extant studies have argued that SMEs can counteract the liability of size and enhance 
their ability to innovate by engaging in networks and OI practices (e.g. Vermeulen, 
2005, Keupp and Gassmann, 2007, O’Regan and Kling, 2011). However, our analysis 
suggests that SMEs in the car industry are slow to engage in networks and OI practices 
due to appropriability concerns and resource limitations. Beyond financial and human 
resources, SMEs are also short of managerial resources and capabilities and find it 
difficult to engage in broad networks due to high opportunity cost of management time. 
Knowledge flows between SMEs and knowledge-generating institutions are obstructed 
by resource limitations as well as differences in management style and priorities.  
While SMEs concentrate on the selection and exploration of knowledge, large 
incumbents take over experimentation and exploitation (O’Connor, 2006). This is not a 
linear process because diversity of knowledge drives innovation and necessitates dense 
networks (Cowan et al, 2004). However, this study strongly suggests that, from the 
viewpoint of the network leader, a network that combines strong dense ties at the centre, 
e.g. around the OEM, and weak dispersed ties in the more peripheral sections of the 
network, could achieve controlled diversity of knowledge while minimizing risks and 
costs. Yet, the insufficient and irregular development of links in the networks may result 
in underutilisation of their potential.  
The data suggest pyramid-shaped networks, stratified according to organisational size, 
with large enterprises – OEMs and Tier 1s – occupying the top strata and organisational 
size decreasing as the pyramid widens downwards.  This large-scale structure consists 
of horizontal and vertical sub-networks with limited scope, the links within and between 
which are mediated by research centres, cluster management and support institutions. 
Cluster management occupies central position in the regional networks.  The need of 
close simultaneous interdisciplinary development is what glues these smaller networks. 
This visualisation has implications for decision making and suggests that the 
management of innovation in the sector needs to be built on an integrative system along 
the innovation processes rather than on isolated players if it is to reap the benefits of 
continuous innovation and minimise knowledge spillovers. 
The network structure suggested by the data resembles ‘fishing nets’ (Burt, 1992), also 
referred to as networks with structural holes, i.e. lower-density structures with many 
relatively weak ties.  The bases of the pyramidal structures consist of SMEs providing 
absorptive capacity to larger incumbents by identifying and implementing new 
technologies, including from other industries, in their products and processes. By doing 
this, SMEs facilitate technological innovation in client companies (Wood, 2006), and 
enhance their adaptability to the rapidly changing environment, including technological 
change and increasing knowledge diversity.  
The Tier 1 suppliers act as a filter between the top of the pyramidal structure and the 
strata, i.e. between the OEM and the lower tier suppliers, by selecting the most viable 
innovative ideas and technologies, developing them to a marketable stage, perhaps 
integrating with own developments, and passing the resulting products/systems on to 
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the OEMs, often in the form of ‘black boxes’ (Jaspers and van de Ende, 2010). While 
the ties at the top - between Tier 1s and the OEM - are strong and dense, the ties 
between and within the strata become weaker and more dispersed further down the 
network structure. Higher density of ties exists at locations around regional clusters, 
which may involve Tier 1s, the OEM, universities and research centres. 
This network model, in which OEMs are central nodes, seems to fit really well with the 
concepts found in small world research. The latter integrates the research on tie strength 
and structural holes in networks. Small world researchers assert that structural holes and 
network cohesion need to coexist to impact positively on innovation and creativity. 
Small world network structure has both a high level of local tie strength and a large 
number of weak bridging ties at the periphery (Fleming and Marx, 2006, Uzzi and 
Spiro, 2005). Capaldo (2007) found that a network structure characterized by a large 
periphery of heterogeneous ties and a core of strong ties around a focal firm brought 
about substantial competitive advantage. Conversely, Rowley et al (2000) concluded 
that a combination of strong ties and high density in a firm’s network undermines 
exploration-centered performance. What sets the networks found in the car industry 
apart from the networks described by small world researchers is the lack of weak ties in 
the top sections of the network, i.e. around OEMs, which ultimately results in lower 
levels of exploration but also in reduced transaction costs. 
The large scale innovation model, which we propose, extends previous research on OI 
in the car industry, which has depicted that patterns of OI are primarily found in vertical 
relationships and that large enterprises developing and manufacturing complex products 
may use different forms of OI resulting in the concurrent existence of combined 
openness and closedness in innovation for different purposes (Karlsson and Sköld, 
2013). The model provides fresh paths for future research on the network relationships 
in the car industry as well as on innovation as complex patterns of interactions between 
individuals, organisations and institutions.   
The proposed model also complies with the suggestion that many different degrees of 
openness may be equally successful depending on the internal and external environment 
and that instead of looking for a general answer, a firm’s particular situation needs to be 
considered, especially its corporate strategy, culture, industry appropriability regime and 
potential risks of implementing OI (Lichtenthaler, 2011, Di Minin et al, 2010, 
Chesbrough, 2003). All of these factors appear to be particularly relevant in the case of 
the car industry.  
While we agree that large enterprises may use many different forms of OI (Karlsson and 
Sköld, 2013), we support the view that OI does not merely require a firm to intensify its 
relationships with external organizations throughout its innovation processes but 
requires the use of a business model through which decisions about innovation are 
evaluated and taken (Chesbrough, 2006b, Chiaroni et al, 2010). 
Last but not least, integrative competencies, efficient management of IP and radical 
cultural change are needed to support the wider adoption of OI in the car industry. The 
issue of trust and the relevant appropriability and credibility issues deserve special 
attention in future research. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
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Perhaps the most important deficiency that surface from our analysis is the weak ties of 
SMEs with other organisations and the lack of ties between SMEs and larger 
incumbents. Despite evident attempts by regional authorities, the desired robust ties 
have been slow to develop. Further efforts in this direction can improve the performance 
of the automobile clusters and networks.  
The research identifies network leadership as a key to driving innovation and points to 
the critical importance of the IP regime and support infrastructure for realising the full 
innovation potential of networks. It also highlights the important role that intermediary 
institutions play in facilitating interorganisational exchanges, creating accommodating 
environment, facilitating joint problem-solving between different stakeholders, 
nurturing trust and credibility, and supporting and motivating the innovation efforts of 
SMEs. Regions that seek to participate in global technology networks must devote as 
much attention to expanding training, disseminating information, creating institutions to 
support SMEs, and assisting communication, as to attempting to attract investment.  
The study strongly suggests that the identified problems of accessibility and disrupted 
knowledge flows can be only resolved if an appropriate mindset exists. OEMs have the 
technological competencies to evaluate and integrate breakthroughs emerging outside of 
the firm. However, they have not yet developed capabilities to support and accelerate 
inflows and outflows of knowledge in the networks thus facilitating innovation and 
efficiency. More specifically, they lack the organisational capabilities to identify, 
coordinate and benefit from emerging, unplanned external developments.  
We contribute to the understanding of the OI concept by examining its applicability in a 
mature capital-intensive asset-based industry, which is preparing for a radical 
technological discontinuity. Such industries may be less dynamic but with more 
momentum, thus manifesting very different characteristics in terms of patterns of 
innovation diffusion, risk management and strategies for exploiting innovation. We 
identify key obstacles to the wider adoption of the OI model in the car industry and 
demonstrate that the OI model, although very attractive, may be not be equally 
applicable to all industry settings. The importance of IP management and intermediate 
markets for the generation of innovation in the car industry deserve more attention from 
scholars as well as from policy makers. 
Finally, the study identifies an interesting pattern of “closedness” in the established 
mature segments of the car industry and tendency for openness in the emerging 
sustainable segments around the design and development of electrical vehicles. Cyclical 
adoption of OI practices appears a plausible proposition for mature asset-based 
industries. Consistent with the idea of OI as a bifocal strategy (Di Minin et al, 2010), 
incumbents may adopt OI strategy in the beginning of the technology life cycle to deal 
with a radical technological discontinuity, followed by internalisation of the consecutive 
innovations as the technology matures, and then by re-externalisation (outsourcing) of 
components as interfaces become standardised (Chesbrough & Kusonoki, 2001, 
Christensen, 2006). This proposition provides an interesting line of enquiry for future 
research.  
Our study is not without limitations. Although a thorough inductive research approach 
to studying OI is important for developing deeper understanding of the process and its 
implications in different settings, we also recognise the limitations of this approach. 
Although we were very careful to avoid bias, as in any qualitative study this concern 
remains. However, we believe that, although not generalizable at this stage, the 
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processes, relationships and dependencies that have emerged from our study provide 
fruitful avenues for future research. 
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF THE RESPONDENTS 
Respondents’ job title, education & 
experience 
Organisation 
Professor, and Founder and Manager  SME, spin-off of a cluster member university 
Technical coordinator  Intermediary providing foreign buyers with support in 
outsourcing activities through linking them with 
suppliers, selected on the strength of their technical, 
qualitative and logistic capabilities. The member 
companies are together potentially able to 
manufacture a vehicle from the drawing board to 
mass production 
[Dr] Head of the Secretariat of the regional 
financial institution; an Engineer, 
Ph.D. In Economics and the 
Management of Technology  
The regional financial institution is the bank of the 
regional government devoted to policy operations. 
The institution takes care of the car sector with 
specific instruments. 
[Dr] researcher in material engineering, 
working on power sources  
University - a cluster member 
 
Founder and General Manager  
 
An engineering SME (40 staff), focused on R&D in the 
field of Electronics. The company provides highly 
specialised engineering services in different sectors: 
automotive, railway and military.  
Managing Director of a regional automotive 
cluster 
The cluster is a business interest association of automotive 
industry suppliers.  
HVEC cluster manager, and project manager 
and partner  
An engineering SME (micro – under 10 staff) originally 
providing services in the field of CAD/CAE, 
dedicated as a supplier partner to support 
engineering activities in development of vehicles 
mostly in designing of passenger cars; offers 
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services in BIW design and simulation]. The cluster 
deals with national and international R&D projects 
in the vehicle sector, from bicycles up to buses and 
trucks 
[Dr] Partner; an engineer and an entrepreneur 
for about 15 years 
An SME (40 staff) developing innovative technical 
development and background services; construction 
of prototypes of alternative and hybrid vehicle 
models, preparations for manufacturing, series 
production 
Innovation Manager  Regional innovation agency 
Project and PR manager in the Regional 
Knowledge Centre for Vehicle 
Industry,  
University - a cluster member 
 
Manager  
 
A large supplier providing a broad range of services to the 
automotive industry in mechanical engineering  
Project Manager in the Competence Centre 
for Mobility Technologies 
Research institute 
[Dr] a researcher and Project Manager  Research institute  
Project Manager for development projects; 
mechanical engineer; 10 years 
experience in the current consulting 
company, 10 years in another company 
providing engineering services to the 
automotive industry 
A large (over 600 employees) specialized engineering and 
consulting company in the fields of electronics and 
information technology, developing software and 
hardware for electronic car units 
Manager Infrastructure Development for 
Fuel-Cell and Battery-Electric 
Vehicles; Previously ‘started in the 
production of condenser powertrain, 
then worked on hybrid vehicles in the 
development centre in Michigan, US, 
then worked on software development 
for production vehicle which is now 
sold in US’  
Major car manufacturer 
[Dr] Cluster manager for two organizations  Regional automotive clusters 
[Dr] Project Manager; background in 
mechanical engineering and software 
services for the automotive industry, 
experience with the Regional 
Economic European Cooperation  
A large (over 600 employees) specialized engineering and 
consulting company in the fields of electronics and 
information technology, developing software and 
hardware for electronic car units  
Head of Powertrain Engineering and 
Advanced Propulsion;  28 years 
experience in the current company; 
background in automotive test and 
development particularly powertrain 
emissions and fuel consumption.  
A large service provider, operating as an independent test 
development facility for the whole of the 
automotive and related industries 
Founder and Managing Director; 41 years 
experience in the industry, started at 16 
on a mechanical apprenticeship, 
worked for Lotus for 19 years 
managing a project team with more 
than 36 people, introducing 8 engines, 
which have resulted in 8 million cars 
in and around Europe and America. 
An engineering design SME (42 employees) working 
closely with clients (oems globally) to develop new 
products and technologies in all areas of mechanical 
engineering; clients span aerospace, automotive, 
industrial, marine, renewables and oil & gas and 
others; active in the renewable energy sector 
through anaerobic digesting, solar PV and wind 
energy. 
Technical Director; also working as a 
consultant on some automotive based 
programs; technical lead on a major 
EV infrastructure development project; 
formerly Chief Electrical Engineer at 
An SME providing consultancy and project management 
for electric vehicle and infrastructure projects; 
focus on integrating transport and infrastructure 
(incl. Infrastructure design and implementation), 
managing a very large scheme for electric plugging 
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Lotus for a period of 18 years; in the 
automotive business for a period of 32 
years; also worked on some energy 
storage projects; Chair of the EDITC 
of the Institute of Engineering and 
Technology 
for hybrid vehicles and running a fleet of 45 
vehicles on behalf and in close cooperation with a 
number of vehicle manufacturers.  
Director of Mergers and Acquisitions Tier 1 Supplier, delivering climate systems, electronics, 
interiors, lighting, engine induction, powertrain 
controls, mobile applications; origin: ‘the 
components manufacturing segment of Ford Motor 
Company’ 
Manager Environmental Strategy; worked for 
another major car manufacturer in a 
variety of roles in Europe and around 
the world for 21 years  
Major car manufacturer 
Professor,  specialist in the programming and 
operation of CNC machine tools 
University - a cluster member  
Process Improvement Consultant; 16 years 
experience in the automotive industry 
(multinational corporation 
environment) working as process 
engineer, production manager, plant 
manager. Participated in the cluster 
establishment and development.  
Consultancy (SME) in the automotive industry for 
projects improvement or training for lean 
manufacturing, six sigma, quality, ISO/TS 16949 
General Manager  An SME (36 people); provides engineering services to 
oems in a variety of engineering disciplines in the 
development of electronic automotive products 
Project Consultant and Project Coordinator Regional Development Agency and Regional Center for 
Innovation and Technology Transfer 
General Manager A regional foundation – part of the regional cluster - that 
governs all the regional automotive industry and 
brings together all of the sector: the manufacturer; 
the components and support services companies; 
and the technological centre.  
Coordinator Corporate university of the regional automotive 
foundation (see above); provides ‘a more specific 
training, not only to respond to the needs of the 
present, but also to the future needs’; ‘we do not 
only hire people, who are professionals in training, 
but who are professionals in the clusters, so that 
they could bring all their knowledge and 
experience’; the training is 100% adapted to the 
needs of the industry. 
Director of the Research Department at 
Automotive Technological Centre 
[Automotive Technological Centre] (more than 300 
people) is an initiative launched by the automotive 
sector. It provides local automotive companies with 
technological support for their activities. It has been 
established to bridge the gap between universities 
and industry.  
Partner and COO in an SME, many years of 
experience in the automobile industry 
SME developing and installing the infrastructure for evs 
 
 
APPENDIX B: DIRECTIONAL INTERVIEW TOPICS 
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 Type of organisation 
 Respondents’ experience 
 
 What is innovation 
 Innovation in the car industry 
o Who innovates in the car industry 
o Drivers of innovation 
o Innovation in SMEs 
o Expectations for the future 
 
 Opportunities for SMEs in the emerging sustainable transport 
 Outsourcing 
o Role of suppliers 
o Role of SMEs 
 
 Collaboration  
o Suppliers-clients relationships 
o Problems 
o SMEs 
o Sharing of ideas 
 
 Relationships or collaboration with other sectors (outside of the car industry)  
 
 Relationships or collaboration with universities or research centres or other institutions 
o Benefits 
o Problems 
 
 Ideas that come from outside the company 
 
 External support (incl. funding) 
 
      Need of further support 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C: EMERGENT CATEGORIES & EXEMPLARY QUOTATIONS 
Research 
objective 
Code Exemplary Quotation 
Network 
formation 
Innovation 
 
 
 
 
Informal network, 
Industrial network 
Credibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cluster, 
Industrial network 
 
 
 
‘I think a network is critical. Otherwise your horizons 
for innovation are going to be very limited.’ R 
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‘We have other innovation networks, a broad network 
of partners, and if we develop an interesting 
project, we approach them and show them our 
approach and normally they are like between 8 
and 25 industrial enterprises that have an 
interest in joining the innovation network and 
developing innovations and future solutions, 
and this is how we come together and start 
working.’ R12 
 
‘Normally you get a couple of universities in the 
cluster, some key stakeholders from the Tier 1s, 
and the SMEs. The mainstream car 
manufacturers are also involved in clusters.’ 
R20 
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Size, 
Industrial network 
 
 
 
Capabilities, 
Networking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stratification (of network) 
 
 
 
Multidisciplinary, 
simultaneous 
(engineering), 
Collaboration 
 
 
Proximity, 
Communication, 
Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
Centrality, 
Leadership 
‘We have around 100 companies in the cluster as well 
as research institutions, universities, labs, public 
authorities.’ R16 
 
’Bigger enterprises tend to underestimate the potential 
of innovation networks. They have big research 
departments on their own and do not need any 
research from us. The interesting aspect for 
them is establishing interesting contacts with 
suppliers. So the networking aspect is for 
OEMs much more important than the actual 
innovation.’ R12 
 
‘I really think this is going to be a network, it is not 
anymore going to be one single player who is 
innovating. I see really a stratification of 
research and innovation in networks.’ R12 
 
‘The teams are multidisciplinary teams and the work is 
based on simultaneous engineering.’ R29 
 
 
‘Especially for the most cutting edge technology, it is 
important to have proximity because projects 
can be very unpredictable. New questions 
appear every day and you need to talk about 
them before you start thinking about solutions. 
This requires intensive communication that you 
can hardly do over electronic media.’ R17 
 
‘The OEM is a nucleus for this kind of companies’ 
R13 
 
 
Knowledge flows Collaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
Integration  
 
 
 
 
‘Black box’ (approach to 
innovation) 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology life cycles, 
Modularity, 
Creativity 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Large companies not only work in universities, but 
they partner with them and contribute. So it is 
not just doing research together but also 
taking responsibility to develop research.’ 
R16 
 
‘They develop some functions themselves and we 
develop additional functions. Then we 
integrate.’ R14 
 
‘OEMs have the architecture, they have certain 
things coming from other suppliers, and they 
need us to develop basic modules and 
components into that whole system. You have 
a specific task, so tactically you are replacing 
an internal department.’ R17 
 
‘You have a task which requires specific knowledge, 
you need someone to work on it for 3 months 
and have it done. So you buy the skills that 
you need just for the time frame that you need 
and keep your organization lean, which is 
probably the main reason why OEMs work 
with a lot of suppliers. Technology is another 
reason because things are changing really fast. 
If you have employees, you would have to 
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Credibility, 
Risk, 
Cost 
 
 
 
Trust, 
Mindset, 
Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
Openness, 
Closedness 
 
 
 
 
Size, 
Accessibility, 
Transparency, 
Idea sourcing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accessibility, 
Closedness, 
Outsourcing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accessibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transaction costs, 
Credibility 
 
 
retrain them every couple of years. But in the 
creative areas they are covered by 
employees.’ R17 
 
‘The situation is different from an IT company where 
you can move from one thing to another more 
dynamically but with less momentum. The 
companies stick to who they know.’ R17 
 
‘They [OEMs] try to open their minds but it goes top 
down so the management board decides but the 
engineers do not open their business. You have 
to trust in others’ knowledge, that is a learning 
process. You need to change the mindsets of the 
guys doing the actual R&D within the company 
to see that they add value if they make use of 
external knowledge.’ R16 
 
‘The luxury car manufacturers, they are very open to 
new ideas. That is one of their sales points. But 
the volume car manufacturers are not open’ 
R25 
 
‘In many ways, it is down to the size of the 
corporations. If an SME came to me and said 
“we have a telematics idea”, I wouldn’t know 
who to direct them to. Somebody who is sitting 
over in [another country] may be responsible 
for the development of telematics. We do not 
have direct knowledge of where a project like 
that would find its target. So, it is accessibility, 
which needs to be made easier and more 
transparent. In many ways, the pool has to come 
from the manufacturer, because there might be 
ideas out there that we as big manufacturers are 
missing.’ R22 
 
‘I think one of the big challenges [to knowledge 
exchange] is for the innovative SMEs to 
actually access the big OEMs. And I think the 
route for that is often through the Tier 1s. It is 
very difficult to get directly into an OEM, 
they tend to work very closely with their 
major Tier 1 suppliers and we are seeing the 
Tier 1s taking more responsibility for 
subsystems and aspects of the vehicle.’ R18 
 
‘So the dominant industrial companies have actually 
picked up quite a lot of innovative ideas that 
have been raised and developed through the 
SMEs but OEMs are not set up to deal with 
the SMEs, they deal with much bigger 
companies.’ R20 
 
‘If you are a small company, the Tier 1s do not care 
about you because it is an additional support 
activity. It means that to coordinate a small 
company takes the same effort as to 
coordinate a middle size and bigger company. 
So the Tier 1 suppliers and the OEMs do not 
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Closedness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Closedness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Closedness, 
Appropriation regime 
 
 
Closedness, 
Appropriability regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appropriability regime, 
Resources 
 
Appropriability regime, 
Resources 
 
 
 
 
Priorities, 
Commercialisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Priorities 
 
 
 
like working with small companies. Only if 
they are very innovative in a particular 
product or service area.’ R7 
 
‘You come across people who have the attitude 
[‘not-invented-here’?], and that is something 
that can really slow down the development 
process. We just founded a little organization 
within our organization and these folks are 
looking at new ideas.’ R15 
 
‘It is a very strong cluster: we have OEMs and mega 
suppliers, and there is a good R&D 
infrastructure, universities, companies who do 
R&D, then we have regional support for the 
SMEs, and informal cluster initiatives. There 
are many networks and opportunities for 
networking for the SMEs, but they could use it 
better. Some SMEs use it, but the majority do 
not use these opportunities. They are not 
opening up to see the benefits of such 
instruments.’ R13 
 
‘Most SMEs do not look at new undertakings due to 
anxiety of knowledge appropriation. It is not 
easy to overcome their reluctance.’  R13 
 
‘Often the SMEs say they have problems that the 
university departments are more theoretical. 
The thing is, the SMEs do not want to let 
outsiders in. They are anxious that other 
companies might get hold of their knowledge. 
This is not easy for them. The OEMs have the 
resources to protect their knowledge, and they 
can differentiate the things they do with 
universities and the things they do themselves. 
They do some research with universities but the 
inside knowledge that is very sensitive, they do 
not let out.’ R13 
 
‘A small company very hardly could fight for their 
intellectual property rights.’ R16 
 
‘It is not easy for SMEs to work with research 
centres and universities because usually they do 
not have so much resources, skilled people and 
also financial resources for innovation.’ R2 
 
‘The timeframe of the academia seems to break up 
the project into small elements. Maybe it is ok 
for research, but if you are looking for product 
development, we have struggled to get those 
guys to work in the same timeframe that we are 
expected to serve that customer base.’ R19, 
SME 
 
‘If there is a specific want from the industry, a 
vehicle manufacturer will approach the 
university and ask whether they have got an 
interest in doing the work. But it is very much 
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Commercialisation 
 
 
 
Closedness 
 
 
 
 
 
Mindset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mindset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trust 
 
 
 
 
Communication, 
Accessibility, 
Mindset 
 
 
down to whether the problem fits what some 
PhD student wants to do. So you can put a 
problem to a university, and it may not be one 
that is picked up.’ R20 
 
‘Companies do not really trust universities because 
they cannot do anything with the research done 
by the university.’ R7 
 
‘At the moment we are a part of a mainstream 
industrial network but we are thinking of going 
out because we think that this kind of network 
cannot give us anything, only something to 
pay.’ R5, SME 
 
‘I would say it really depends upon the chances and 
possibilities that partners see within this 
network. If the people who are involved are 
enthusiastic about a topic, they can push a lot, 
and if they do not, certain topics just stay 
untouched.’ R12 
 
‘I would not necessarily say it is something that an 
organizational change would improve, it is 
more like the mindset, what people think, how 
open they are. It is easy to say the company has 
to do that. You have to do it yourself, you have 
to be open and encourage people around you to 
be open and that is the only way you can make 
a difference. The people are the company and 
you cannot change the people by simply giving 
a department a new name or setting up 
procedures. If those people do not want to do 
that, if they are not open, nothing will change.’ 
R15 OEM 
 
‘A lot of trust was lost during the last 20 years due to 
very heavy procurement rules along the value-
chain. Now maybe we have a kind of recovery.’ 
R16 
 
‘So the main question is how we can remove these 
barriers in the communication and enable 
companies to have steady contacts with the 
right people because it really comes down to 
who you know.’ R17 
 
The role of 
different size 
enterprises in 
innovation 
Leadership, 
Innovation 
 
 
Leadership, 
Innovation 
 
 
Credibility, 
Accessibility 
 
 
 
‘I think most innovations will be driven by the car 
manufacturers and will be executed by the Tier 
1 suppliers.’ R15 
 
 ‘Tier 1s are the most expected to innovate. And they 
manage all the other suppliers with their 
innovations.’ R24 
 
‘Smaller innovative companies cannot break into the 
market of supplying the OEMs because they do 
not have the credibility. So they sell to the Tier 
1 suppliers.’ R19 
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Innovation, 
Commercialisation, 
Leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation, 
Capabilities 
 
 
 
Leadership, 
Innovation, 
Modularity, 
Product complexity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commercialisation, 
Leadership, 
“Black box”, 
Capabilities, 
Integration, 
Coordination 
 
 
 
 
Innovation, 
Integration, 
Coordination, 
Exploration/exploitation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation, 
Resources 
 
 
 
 
Innovation, 
Exploration/exploitation, 
Rents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘OEMs work very close together with Tier 1 
suppliers because Tier 1 suppliers are the 
companies that develop the new technologies. 
But the final decision to introduce the 
innovative technology in a product is the 
OEM’s. The OEMs have R&D departments 
where they try to identify the best innovation to 
be introduced.’ R29 
 
‘Not to my knowledge. From my perspective, we 
have a strong engineering organization and also 
a technical development centre.’ R22  
 
‘Collaboration between car manufacturers and 
suppliers is very important in terms of 
accessing and forecasting what is going to be 
coming in the future and how that can be 
integrated into vehicles. So I guess we do rely 
on our suppliers to bring new ideas to us about 
things that are going to be happening. You 
know we are experts in building and selling 
cars, and we are not necessarily experts in 
things like telematics for example.’ R22 
 
‘OEMs do not have the deep understanding of what 
is inside or the factors that are influencing from 
the design side of the process, and then 
probably we as do not understand exactly what 
the customers want. In other cases, it could be 
that the customer wants two things at the same 
time that are technically not possible. And then 
we need to discuss and find compromise.’ R25 
 
‘I do not think so [SMEs are good at innovation]. It 
is not simply a matter of resources. That is a 
matter of the functioning of the value-chain. In 
the past innovation was done by OEMs and Tier 
1 suppliers. Now things are changing so OEMs 
and Tier 1s require innovation from tier 2, 3 and 
4. But it makes no sense if tier 3 or 4 companies 
are innovating but there is no idea at the OEM 
at the end of the value-chain.’ R16 
 
‘Most of the new car innovations come from other 
[smaller] companies but it is very complicated 
for them to get finance, and to get investment, 
and therefore a lot of innovations could not 
reach the right phase where they could go into 
production.’ R8 
 
‘I have seen a number of them, technologies that 
have been developed in a small organization, 
which have then been bought up by the Tier 1 
suppliers going into the OEMs. […] This small 
organization is then bought up by the bigger 
Tier 1 suppliers to get access to their 
technology. I think you would find out that the 
likes of […] have had many acquisitions in the 
last 20 years where they have bought into 
expertise that they did not have in their own 
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Rents, 
Resources, 
Credibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opportunity, 
Openness 
 
 
 
 
 
Opportunity, 
Specialisation, 
 
 
Rents 
 
 
 
Opportunity, 
Competencies, 
Resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
portfolio, expertise that gives them a stronger 
place in the market.’  R19 
 
‘There is a company or an individual with a specific 
IP, which then gets the interest of a major 
company. The major company in many cases 
then buys out the SME. It is very rare that an 
SME capitalizes on its IP and grows to where it 
becomes a self-sustaining company because 
that is really serious capitalization. Vehicle 
manufacturers do not purchase equipment from 
SME’s because of viability.’ R20 
 
‘There is still a quite broad field [around eMobility] 
which is not so much defined and could develop 
into a big market in the future. By having a 
smart idea, SMEs could really enter and 
position themselves in a quite new market, and 
it is pretty open still.’ R12 
 
‘Technology accelerates at such a speed that there is 
a constant increase in the call for specializations 
and therefore opportunities for the SMEs.’ R22  
 
‘SMEs could bring fresh ideas to all these areas but 
at they will be taken over by an OEM or by a 
tier 1 if they are successful.’ R16 
 
‘I do not see that many opportunities, basically 
because they [electrical vehicles] are not 
important in the market today. If the SMEs 
develop core competencies based on the future 
of the electrical vehicles, I think it would be a 
failure in the short term because the market is 
not buying those parts.’ R27  
 
The facilitating 
role of 
intermediaries 
Trust, 
Credibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managerial capabilities 
 
 
 
 
Managerial capabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Networking, 
Ties, 
Managerial 
‘If someone has an idea and go to the bank for 
money, often the banks say “you have to talk to 
the cluster because we are not experts in the 
automotive industry”.  And the same happens 
with the government when they look for public 
funds.’ R27 
 
‘We have also an area devoted to innovation 
management. We support the companies in 
getting support from public institutions, or 
identifying possible partners to share 
technologies.’ R29 
 
‘SMEs perform similar to large companies [in terms 
of innovation] but need much more 
management support to establish the project 
structures, to facilitate the activities. Large 
companies are able to do it on their own.’ R16 
 
‘We do common marketing and push innovation and 
research. We work consistently on upgrading 
R&D competencies and buy equipment for our 
technology centres, which the companies use 
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competencies, 
R&D competencies 
 
 
 
 
Networking, 
Ties 
 
 
Leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
Information, 
Communication 
Closedness, 
Leadership, 
Centrality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information, 
Communication, 
Closedness 
 
 
 
Information, 
Communication, 
Closedness 
 
 
 
Trust, 
Credibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trust, 
Credibility 
 
 
 
 
Capabilities, 
Commercialisation 
together. Another field is education and 
training. We support SMEs with training that is 
not available but is needed for the suppliers, 
especially resource management, project 
management, quality management.’ R6 
 
‘We push SMEs to work together, horizontally and 
vertically.’ R2 
 
‘Unfortunately, the big players from this region are 
not present in the cluster. The activity would 
improve and grow if the big players were in the 
cluster. But this is not happening even though 
the guys from the [regional support] agency put 
a lot of effort in that.’ R25  
 
‘You have to give more information [to SMEs] 
about the mutual benefits they can draw from 
collaboration. Many SMEs do not know about 
these possibilities. I see research institutes like 
us, and also organizations like the state 
agencies, who are facilitators in this process, 
doing the management of information. It is very 
helpful when there is one actor who brings the 
actors together and coordinates the activities, 
and helps them shape and define the projects so 
they can play well together.’ R12   
 
‘It may be the case that universities do not know 
what projects are out there, and sometimes I 
guess industry might not know the facilities that 
could be implemented at universities.’ R22 
 
‘The real problem is to find the match, trigger the 
need.  How do you get this company to offer 
their services to, let’s say, Porsche, or how can 
Porsche find this company? Somehow the 
networks are limited.’ R17 
 
‘The cluster could be a solution because you have to 
find the trust at some level. You need to have a 
number of companies willing to say “that is 
how it could work, and our bundle will act as a 
partner to Daimler, and this is who will do the 
job, but if he fails we are going to jump in and 
save the game.” It is all about trust and the 
intermediary organizations could plant the seed 
of this trust, feed it, water it and try to be the 
gardener of it. They can ensure that all the 
frictions that exist in the networks are 
managed.’ R17 
 
‘The clusters should invest into know-how. You 
cannot do it as an outsider. You do actually 
need to have at least a basic understanding of 
the technologies in order to be trusted so that 
the rest follow you.’ R17 
 
‘We can provide them with support in all the phases 
of the development of products. Not basic 
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Openness, 
Collaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credibility, 
Closedness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communication,  
Information, 
Ties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
research, but we can analyse the new 
technologies and try to adapt them to a 
complete application, we can collaborate with 
the company in applied research phase of the 
project, also in the conceptual phase, we can 
even give support in the production phase.’ R29 
 
‘So our [research] institute has a very close 
relationship with the university. Some of my 
team are employed by the university, others are 
employed by the research institute but we work 
together on the same projects. So it is just a 
matter of administrative separation, but that was 
the intention. We can draw a lot of resources 
from the university and do also basic research.’ 
R12  
 
‘I have seen people here or in the premises who are 
independent employees but who cannot work as 
independent employees for Daimler. So they 
work for a services supplier who watches over 
them and deliver the goods with the promised 
quality and cost. So they just give a part of their 
profit share to these companies who act as a 
contact and a security buffer between them and 
the customer.’ R17 
 
‘Traditionally the universities are not very close to 
the real needs of the industry, and this is the 
reason why the model for a technological centre 
was proposed. It was just to bridge the gap 
between research from the university, and the 
needs of the industry.’ R29 
 
 
